I Introduction
Everyone has experienced feeling pain. Despite its universality, pain is not well understood. It is typically thought of as the body's automatic response to tissue injury -it has an identifiable origin, its intensity reflects the extent of that injury and it ebbs with time. 1 However, this common conception only reflects one category of pain: acute pain. The other category, chronic pain, is less widely known and afflicts sufferers for a prolonged period of time. Chronic pain syndrome (CPS) is a poorly understood medical condition in which pain signals in a person's central nervous system are active, making the sufferer feel pain, when they should be inactive.
The focus of this paper is whether sufferers of primary CPS should be entitled to cover from New Zealand's Accident Compensation scheme (ACC), 2 particularly in light of the recent Supreme Court decision in
Allenby v H (Allenby). While courts have held that CPS itself does not
constitute a physical injury under the scheme, Allenby offers a new precedent on the meaning of physical injury and therefore presents an opportunity for the courts to reconsider the current exclusion of CPS. Policy factors point away from extending cover to sufferers of CPS and demand that the status quo is maintained. A legislative amendment which clarifies the existing position is recommended.
II Present Coverage of Chronic Pain Syndrome

A Overview of Chronic Pain Syndrome
The nervous system of CPS sufferers incorrectly sends active pain signals when they should be inactive. This incorrect signalling can occur after an injury where the pain is post-traumatic but persists long after the injury has healed. In other cases, the focus of this paper, pain is primary rather than following trauma and is experienced despite there being no apparent triggering injury. For these sufferers, there has been no tissue damage like a cut or broken bone to explain why they feel pain. The case of Barbara Teen provides an example of primary CPS. 3 Ms Teen was employed by Telecom as a Credit Service Representative, a job which involved telephone use and considerable data entry using a computer keyboard. The environment was highly stressful with commercially driven attitudes, continued monitoring of performance and few opportunities for muscle relaxation and changes of position. After seven months of work she experienced pain in her neck, shoulder, back and arms; this was diagnosed as occupational overuse syndrome caused by her work as a computer operator, later classified as CPS, regional pain syndrome or fibromyalgia. 4 Although she continued working for a period Ms Teen was later deemed unfit to work so began receiving weekly ACC compensation.
Ms Teen's condition is an example of primary CPS, one of two broad categories of CPS. It is accepted that cover may be provided for the other category, post-traumatic CPS, where the pain syndrome is the consequence of or a progression from a discrete personal injury for which ACC cover is available. 5 The focus of this paper is "an entirely separate and distinct question" of entitlement where CPS is labelled primary because it arises spontaneously and is not consequential on an antecedent personal injury, as was the case with Ms Teen. 6 Claimants in these situations often argue that their CPS is work-related and caused by repetitive movement in unsatisfactory working environments with poor ergonomics.
Fibromyalgia is an example of a chronic pain condition where pain is felt in several parts of the body and is not typically preceded by tissue injury. 7 The
It is useful to distinguish between the causes of CPS on the one hand and, on the other, the physiological mechanisms or bodily changes which take place when a person has CPS. This distinction was explained in Teen v
Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Corporation (Teen):
"There is no doubt that chronic pain is experienced on the basis of very real cellular, biochemical and function changes in the central and peripheral nervous system. However, these physical changes do not imply any specific origin." 12 A great deal of controversy exists over the condition's causes, whereas the bodily changes which take place are reasonably well understood.
13
The range of possible causes is illustrated in the evidence provided by medical experts in Teen. While one specialist contended that workers in monotonous, repetitive jobs are predisposed to CPS, 14 another specialist said that it has never been established that physical factors at work cause the condition. 15 Genetic susceptibility, emotional factors, a lack of fitness and being self-driven and over-conscientious were considered possible 8 At 37. 9 
A The Decision in Allenby
The Solicitor General made the same argument in Allenby as was accepted in ACC v D: that pregnancy is not a physical injury as it is a biological process which does not damage a woman's anatomy. 46 The plaintiff in
Allenby suffered mental injuries after becoming pregnant following a failed sterilisation procedure.
The Supreme Court unanimously adopted a more expansive interpretation of physical injury and rejected the argument that, given the absence of bodily damage, pregnancy cannot constitute an injury. The majority judgment of Blanchard, McGrath and William Young JJ noted that pregnancy "causes significant physical changes to the woman's anatomy, which… cause discomfort and, at least ultimately, pain and suffering". 47 Given that diseases or infections consequential on medical misadventure can be classed as personal injury, the majority argued that including pregnancy as a personal injury does not involve "any great stretching of language".
48
Elias CJ similarly held that, if a sprain or strain amounts to personal injury, "impregnation (with its profound impact on the physiology of the woman) is properly seen as a physical injury". 49 The physical impacts of pregnancy are "more than merely transitory and of greater consequence than the examples given of a strain or sprain". physical changes which occur during pregnancy cause pain and suffering and are of greater consequence and duration than a strain or sprain.
51
The interpretation that physical injury requires damage to the anatomy, as 51 At [88] .
This expanded interpretation of physical injury cannot simply be superimposed from the pregnancy context into a CPS situation to immediately undermine the conclusion in Teen. The Allenby reasoning did not rely solely on the bodily changes and impacts of pregnancy; parts of the decision do not apply in the CPS context. Possible distinguishing features, considered in turn below, are the Court's reliance on the legislative history specific to pregnancy, the scheme of the Act which separates out the various causes of personal injury, and policy factors.
Possible distinguishing features
The first distinguishing point and a major factor in the Supreme Court's decision was the "tortuous history" of accident compensation legislation.
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The scheme was extended in 1974 to specifically cover pregnancy resulting from rape. The removal of this reference to pregnancy in 1992 did not exclude pregnancy from cover; had Parliament intended this it would, reasoned the majority, have done so expressly. 56 As impregnation is a physical injury covered under the scheme when it results from rape, impregnation is also a physical injury when it results from medical misadventure. 57 This follows from the Act's separation of the question of personal injury from the cause of that injury, meaning the standalone definition of personal injury is the same for the various covered causes listed in the legislation.
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An analogous argument cannot be advanced in the case of CPS as there has never been express reference to the condition as a personal injury.
A second possible distinguishing feature is that primary CPS claims fall under the cause "work-related gradual process, disease or infection", whereas pregnancy is covered as either an accident or treatment injury. One might contend that the Allenby interpretation of physical injury does not apply to CPS given that it falls under a different cause. This difference is not 55 Allenby, above n 46, at [68] . 56 At [68] . 57 At [76] . 58 At [76] .
material as the legislative scheme is to provide a common definition of personal injury in s 26, separate from the various causes of that injury. The Supreme Court relied on this separation in holding that the answer to whether pregnancy is a personal injury must "logically be the same in respect of both causes. The fact that one results from medical misadventure and the other from accident cannot make any difference." 59 Applying this reasoning, the interpretation of physical injury should not differ in CPS cases simply because it falls under a different cause.
The Court also stated that the medical misadventure provisions (since replaced by the treatment injury regime) provide an exception to the no fault nature of the scheme, which "may suggest that they are concerned with things which are not ordinarily to be classed as physical injuries". Policy factors which pointed towards pregnancy being covered were also relevant to the decision. Whilst recognising that the 1992 reform was in response to cost increases, Blanchard J considered that the costs relating to pregnancy were not substantial in the overall context of the scheme and noted that there were just 72 claims for pregnancy resulting from medical misadventure over 11 years. 61 Elias CJ similarly found that there were no convincing reasons based on the statute's purpose for refusing to treat pregnancy as a physical injury.
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The Supreme Court in Allenby adopted a broader interpretation of physical injury which does not require damage to the anatomy. The case is not directly on point and therefore would not bind a lower court considering 59 At [87] . 60 At [63] . 61 At [69] . 62 At [19] .
whether CPS is a physical injury. Nonetheless, and as the following discussion demonstrates, it remains arguable that the Allenby interpretation of physical injury should be applied in the CPS context. Given that there is little statutory guidance defining physical injury, only the examples of a strain or sprain, it is desirable for the courts to develop a standard and generally applicable interpretation.
Furthermore, whilst the Supreme Court's reasoning was grounded to an extent in factors specific to pregnancy like the legislative history, the Court's judgment should not be so narrowly construed. The majority stated that the expression personal injury is "used in an expansive way"; 64 while the Chief Justice contended that the phrase "must be interpreted in the light of the purposes of the Act which are concerned with establishing entitlements for impairment, rehabilitation, and treatment". 65 This broad focus on the principle of comprehensive cover is important given its contrast to the narrow interpretation reliant on the principle of damage as adopted in ACC v 63 Accident Compensation Corporation v D, above n 45, at [66] (emphasis added). 64 Allenby, above n 46, at [69] . 65 At [18] .
"yet again mandated that the ACC legislation be interpreted expansively". 67 Consequently, the question of ACC entitlement for CPS, previously settled by Teen as excluded from cover, could nevertheless be reopened in light of
Allenby. Tennent considers that Allenby provides "an opportunity, indeed an obligation" to reconsider ACC cover for CPS. 68 The issue is whether the courts should apply the wider Allenby interpretation of physical injurywhich emphasises bodily changes accompanied by pain and suffering, without requiring damage -beyond the pregnancy context. If it did so, CPS would constitute a physical injury and upon proving workplace causation claimants would be entitled to ACC cover. However, while Allenby provides a significant precedent by which the outcome in Teen can be questioned, the courts would not be able to rely on that precedent alone without considering the many policy factors relevant to the issue. The following section contends that policy factors point away from an expansive interpretation of physical injury and demand that the status quo be maintained.
IV Policy Rationale for Excluding Cover
Considering the purpose and policy behind legislation is a key part of statutory interpretation. 69 Todd contends that the purpose section in the ACC legislation gives little guidance on resolving boundary issues and instead it is necessary to look to sources beyond the statute. 70 The first source considered below, the principles of the Woodhouse Report, is shown to be of limited value in determining where the precise boundaries of the scheme should lie.
A The Woodhouse Principles
The Woodhouse Report articulated five general principles which underpin the scheme, namely: community responsibility, comprehensive entitlement, complete rehabilitation, real compensation and administrative efficiency.
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Community responsibility and comprehensive entitlement were considered the foundational principles of the scheme. 72 Community responsibility holds that, given the benefits that society derives from the productive work of its citizens, society should accept responsibility for those who cannot work due to physical incapacity. 73 For Oliphant, the principle demands that the mere fact of incapacity which deprives an individual of the ability to contribute to society's general welfare triggers the community's obligation to provide support.
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The Woodhouse principle of administrative efficiency is relevant to this issue but is better addressed in the context of the following section.
An emphasis on these principles points towards providing ACC cover to CPS sufferers. The incapacity experienced is great; many lose their job or their condition makes them unsuitable for previous workplace tasks. 75 Community responsibility demands that society recognises the collective benefits previously contributed by these sufferers through their work and in response provides them with rehabilitation and compensation. On this view, it is counterproductive to exclude a group of incapacitated workers and, through the denial of funded rehabilitation, reduce the likelihood that they will return to work. 
B Other Relevant Policy Factors
Given the limited utility of the Woodhouse principles in assessing this issue, the following section evaluates the broader interpretation of physical injury against a wider range of policy factors. These principles demand that the status quo, which excludes CPS from classification as a physical injury, is maintained.
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The need for clear boundaries
The first relevant policy factor is the need for clear boundaries marking the edges of the scheme. Given that the scheme is limited in scope, the meaning of physical injury should clearly delineate the boundary between conditions which are covered and those which are not. The status quo best achieves this clarity. and rehabilitation, where they are most useful, rather than towards litigation, these lines should be clearly defined. The existing position effectively marks the boundaries of the scheme, whereas adopting the broader interpretation of physical injury will blur its edges, promoting litigation where entitlement will be entirely dependent on the vastly different medical opinions presented in and accepted by the court.
The purpose of the separate personal injury requirement
The second relevant policy factor is the purpose of the standalone requirement that a claimant show personal injury. Since 1992 the ACC legislation has created two hurdles a claimant must overcome before they are entitled to cover. They must first prove the existence of a personal injury and then prove that it was caused in one of several listed circumstances.
Requiring that claimant's first show the existence of a personal injury separate from its cause provides a key limit on the scope of ACC cover. The following section discusses how an interpretation of physical injury which 98 Allenby, above n 46, at [7] per Elias CJ.
includes CPS undermines the legislative scheme which has been in place since 1992.
The narrow interpretation of physical injury adopted in Teen, which requires damage to the anatomy, not only excludes CPS but many other medical conditions from classification as physical injuries. Professor Gorman called it "nonsense" to argue that CPS is an injury due to the body's physical changes. 99 Adopting that interpretation would mean that conditions like diabetes, migraine headaches and rheumatoid arthritis would also constitute injuries given their associated physical changes. 100 "Indeed" he considered "by the definition of physical changes = injury, all diseases would be injuries."
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Adopting this wider interpretation of physical injury will therefore not only affect the scope of cover for CPS but risks increasing the number of ACC claims for other medical conditions. The standalone requirement for personal injury is seen as having an important filtering effect by limiting ACC entitlement. 102 This filtering effect would be undermined if virtually any disease could be classed as a physical injury. In addition, given that psychological factors may be a cause of CPS, classifying the condition as a physical injury blurs the distinction within the legislation between physical and mental injuries.
Judge Beattie in Waitemata dismissed these concerns; he considered that even if conditions like migraines are classified as a personal injury the claimant would not be entitled to cover unless they show that it was caused in one of the required ways. 103 The definition of personal injury recognises that it can include a gradual process, disease or infection but expressly excludes these from cover unless they are work-related or arise as a treatment injury.
There is some strength to Judge Beattie's contention. For example, as migraines are normally classified as diseases, 105 a claimant must show that the condition was work-related or caused by treatment. 106 Hence the real filtering section is proving that a condition is work-related. 107 Showing that an injury was caused by treatment will also be substantial hurdle to cover; a claim seeking cover for migraines following physiotherapy treatment was rejected because there was no physical injury and also no causative link.
108
There is therefore no risk that migraine sufferers will suddenly be entitled en masse to ACC cover. However this does not fully address the problem.
Additional litigation would likely be encouraged since the first obstacle to entitlement, showing the existence of a personal injury, would be overcome.
There may be circumstances where the requisite causal connection is established meaning that cover would be available to a wider class of claimants. Defining physical injury narrowly better limits the scope of cover rather than relying on a case-by-case causation analysis as would be required if the wider interpretation were adopted.
Furthermore, classing a broader range of conditions as physical injuries is problematic because it disregards the legislative framework. As quoted in full above, McLay contends that, when dealing with cases at the boundaries of the scheme, courts must uphold the integrity of the legislation passed by Parliament and take seriously the deliberate gaps in entitlement. 109 A key component in the 1992 reform was the creation of a standalone requirement for personal injury independent from its cause. Interpreting physical injury so broadly that all diseases would meet the test makes the first requirement of cover redundant. This cannot have been intended by Parliament when deliberately creating the standalone requirement and therefore fails to uphold the integrity of legislation currently in place.
Another purpose of the separate requirement for personal injury, as contended by Judge Cadenhead, is to provide an objective point of reference
Specialist physician Dr Alchin contended that "to cover such cases by workers compensation benefits… is in fact a potent cause of these cases".
114
The provision of compensation causes or exacerbates the condition by:
115 …encouraging a belief that a worker's acute but minor pain is actually sinister, as it is recognised by workers' compensation as "compensable injury" … It therefore encourages the adoption of an invalid role and "illness behaviour", by legitimising and facilitating the role of a chronic invalid.
There are conflicting studies on the extent of the risk posed by malingering.
One study found that fibromyalgia is more prevalent in Amish populations, who do not seek compensation for their condition, than non-Amish In practice however, this author is not aware of any cases of primary CPS taken against an employer following a denial of ACC cover. In addition to the aforementioned difficulties in establishing workplace causation, it would likely be very difficult to prove that the ergonomics of a particular workplace were negligent. The scope of entitlement under the common law does not therefore provide any impetus to extend cover to CPS; there is no abundance of claims against employers which demand that they take out additional insurance.
Financial implications
A fourth factor by which the proposed interpretation of physical injury should be assessed is its financial implications. Furthermore, an analysis of the financial implications should also consider the likelihood of successful treatment. Ideally, the provision of rehabilitation by ACC means that claimants can return to work and productivity more rapidly. There are of course certain serious injuries which are covered by the scheme despite the impossibility of a return to work. Nonetheless in considering less-severe borderline cases a cost-benefit analysis by which the potential for a return to productivity can be assessed is relevant.
Extending ACC cover to CPS would not likely produce the desired return to productivity which could justify the high cost of rehabilitation.
Rehabilitating CPS is a long-term and intensive process. scheme. Consequently it is unlikely that CPS will become covered through court action meaning the preferable status quo will be maintained.
B Refine the Definition of Physical Injury
A second option which upholds the status quo is a legislative amendment to refine the definition of physical injury. This could take two forms. The first is amending the provision which defines physical injury, s 26 (1) There are however several problems with enacting a more precise definition.
It would have implications for other conditions presently covered by the scheme. For example, this amendment would undermine the reasoning in Allenby and instead reflect the finding in the earlier ACC v D decision, once again excluding pregnancy from cover. This could be remedied through a specific pregnancy provision which clarifies that pregnancy constitutes a personal injury but, as in Allenby, explicitly limits cover to cases of sexual violation and treatment injury.
Whilst a pregnancy provision would be fairly easily implemented, the need for such a provision reflects a broader problem. The scheme is so large that it quickly becomes impractical, and requires an unrealistic level of engagement from Parliament, if changes to its scope demand a litany of specific amendments. Defining physical injury could also prevent unforeseen but principled future developments from taking place; had a narrow definition been enacted earlier, a case like Allenby would have been prevented. This amendment is therefore undesirable because it responds to a small problem -the low risk that CPS will be covered through judicial action -in an undiscerning and disproportionate way.
Consequently, a second legislative amendment is preferable. This would add a further paragraph to s 26 which clarifies that personal injury caused by work-related gradual process, disease or infection can include pain that is a direct consequence of a lesion of the somatosensory system, meaning physical damage to the body's pain pathways. This amendment was
proposed by the Department of Labour 135 and supported by the Law Society. 136 It codifies the status quo by maintaining the requirement of damage to the anatomy, meaning CPS would not itself constitute a physical injury. As it is limited to pain conditions the amendment retains a desirable flexibility and would not affect, for example, the classification of pregnancy as a physical injury. While the number of primary CPS claims taken to court has rapidly reduced since Teen, they have not disappeared entirely. 137 The utility of this amendment is therefore to clarify the existing position, ensure consistency in its application and limit the potential for futile but costly appeals to be made.
Given the low chance that a Judge would adopt the Allenby precedent as justification for classing CPS as a physical injury, a legislative definition to prevent this is not essential. The second proposed legislative change should nonetheless be enacted as it usefully clarifies the law without wider implications for ACC entitlement.
VI Conclusion
New Zealanders would ultimately be best served by the enactment of a fully comprehensive compensation scheme which covers incapacity due to both accident and illness. However, this expansion must be made by Parliament and not in an ad hoc manner through the courts. Judicial interpretation of the Accident Compensation Act should instead reflect the reality that entitlement under the present scheme is tightly circumscribed. Thus, while the recent decision in Allenby provides an opportunity to reconsider whether CPS constitutes a physical injury, the status quo should be maintained. The existing position best upholds the integrity of the current legislation and clearly marks the boundaries of the scheme. Although possible, it is unlikely that the courts would use the Allenby reasoning to classify CPS a physical injury; nonetheless the recommended amendment would bring welcome clarity to this area of the law and should accordingly be enacted.
